The fund industry recently lost its second case on the use of control share bylaws, which seek to limit the ability of large shareholders to vote their shares after their holdings exceed a defined threshold.

A recent BoardIQ article demonstrates, in my view, the perverse way in which trustees are encouraged to think about an investment adviser’s business.

Granite Construction Inc. stockholders have filed a proposed $7.5 million settlement in the Delaware Chancery Court for litigation arising from $338 million in cost overruns concealed from investors between 2017 and 2019.

Granite Construction will pay $7.5 million and adopt a series of oversight reforms to end shareholder litigation over claims that its board concealed hundreds of millions in overruns affecting four “mega-projects.”

Morris Kandinov LLP partners Aaron Morris and Andrew Robertson were recently profiled and quoted in a BoardIQ article regarding the use of inspection demands in advance of litigation involving investment companies.

Morris Kandinov LLP has filed two cases seeking to recover losses incurred by investors in the Infinity Q Diversified Alpha Fund (the “Fund”), a mutual fund that announced in early 2021 that it was liquidating because of extensive securities pricing errors that rendered its last reported net asset value (“NAV”) inaccurate.

Morris Kandinov LLP represents investors in the Fiduciary/Claymore Energy Infrastructure Fund (FMO) in connection with the fund’s losses during an early 2020 liquidity crisis and a subsequent proposal to merge with the Kayne Anderson Energy Infrastructure Fund Inc (KYN).

A shareholder of the Fiduciary/Claymore Energy Infrastructure Fund (FMO), a closed-end energy fund, has filed an action against the fund’s investment adviser, subadviser, and board of trustees in connection with the fund’s liquidity crisis in 2020 and subsequently announced merger with another closed-end fund.

Morris Kandinov LLP has filed a derivative suit on behalf of shareholders of the Fiduciary/Claymore Energy Infrastructure Fund (FMO) against the fund’s board of trustees and investment advisers. The case arises from the fund’s collapse after a liquidity crisis in early 2020 and the fund’s unexpected tax expenses disclosed thereafter.

The Delaware Court of Chancery, in an October 2021 opinion, held that a board wrongfully refused a stockholder demand because it was “reasonable to infer that the directors just did not care about complying with the legal requirements of Delaware law.” The decision is a reminder to directors that their fiduciary duties do not permit them to cursorily refuse a legitimate stockholder demand, and a reminder to investors that they have meaningful legal options if a board refuses to remedy clear corporate misconduct.